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New Challenges for Law Enforcement; Professional Standards Officers
Typically an Internal Affairs (I-A) investigation concludes with one of four findings: "Sustained," "Not Sustained," "Exonerated" or "Unfounded." If an officer is cleared, the inquiry usually ends and a lawsuit might begin.
What if an officer, who is accused of misconduct, has acted within the agency's policies, but harm has resulted to someone because of a policy deficiency? Similarly, what if that officer performed within the agency’s training guidelines, but harm resulted because of a training deficiency?
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Irregular Warfare Is Warfare
Violent extremism is the most likely and dangerous threat the Nation will face between now and 2020. U.S. superiority in conventional warfighting has driven our adversaries to avoid direct military confrontation. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) began with the recognition that irregular warfare (IW) has become the "warfare of choice" for our adversaries, who employ a strategy of physical, economic, and psychological subversion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode the power, influence, and will of the United States and its strategic partners. They fight us among the people in protracted struggles for popular support and legitimacy, limiting the utility of conventional applications of our military power.
Our adversaries are unconventional, and so our approach for defeating them must be unconventional as well. We cannot defeat them solely by force; we must use a blend of political, informational, military, economic, and sociocultural approaches, in combination with foreign governments, security forces, and populations.
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Capturing knowledge
"We rely too much on others to bring information to us, and too often don't understand what is reported back because we do not understand the context of what we are told."
Since October 2002, over 40 brigade-sized U.S. Army units have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, with most deploying two or more times. The experience of hundreds of intelligence analysts from those units should make each rotation more beneficial than the first. On the contrary, the brigades did not occupy the same locations as before and analysts rotated to other assignments or opted to leave the service. The Army Times reported that by late 2006, less than half the deployed Soldiers in Iraq had greater than four years experience. (2) Less than half the Soldiers that entered the War on Terror are still fighting it. For the analysts who left the Army, or those no longer deployed, their knowledge is misplaced and largely unused. The new analysts have little means of knowing who is the most knowledgeable in any subject and would have few options for contacting them if they found out. Current knowledge management (KM) lives on PowerPoint, dumped in databases, or otherwise lost to the world of zeros and ones. This system fails to capture the experience of individuals and falls shy of maintaining the tacit or anecdotal knowledge that survives in context in the analyst's mind. The individual is ineffectively
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Assessing the Criminal Dimension of Complex Environments
By Lieutenant Colonel Al Bazzinotti and Lieutenant Colonel Mike Thomas
More than a decade ago, Army force developers recognized that as an instrument of national power, the military may be used more frequently in complex environments characterized by high urban or rural population densities, developed infrastructures, cultural sensitivities, the rule of law (ROL), and proficient information capabilities. The Army, which is maneuver-centric and typically verse to nation-building or constabulary operations, was without many formal references for operations in these environments. Because the manner in which military forces conduct sustained operations in complex environments may be fundamentally different from war-
fighting elsewhere, the Army responded with a host of tools designed to assist military leaders in the planning and execution of operations in complex environments. “Civil considerations” was added to the hasty planning term of METT-T—resulting in mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC); and new manuals were drafted on domestic-support operations, peace operations, force protection, and other nonstandard activities that may be conducted in complex environments.
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Thinking assignment: Are we ready?
With all the think tanks in and around the Beltway, the shear mass of reports, position papers and policy recommendations is leaden, yet every now then there's a vein of gold. In this case, we have a paper that examines the federal homeland security apparatus and makes some very specific recommendations that are relevant to all: Wormuth, C.E., and Witkowsky, A., 2008, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or Not)? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 85 pp. Free download here.
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